Moral premises are often based on a felt sense rather than evidence, the should of them represents a preference which is subjective and derived from context such as environment and culture rather than evidence.
It contradicts your original point because it shows that we can’t assign the attribute “irrational” to an expectation; it’s like assigning colours to a transparent object.
Moral premises are often based on a felt sense rather than evidence, the should of them represents a preference which is subjective and derived from context such as environment and culture rather than evidence.
I’m not sure but I think this to be true. Even then, that moral premise would be the only way to actually use the evidence to label the expectation as rational or irrational; something like “evidence shows that acting acc. to those expectations would hinder/further the moral premise, thus being irrational/rational”.
We have reached the point in the discussion where to move forwards we need to define terms.
By rational in this context I think what I’m meaning is a choice based on evidence which indicates that a given course of action is likely to result in the outcome intended.
Like how if my neighbour parks on my front lawn, my immediate response is to smash his car and the rational response is to talk to him calmly. Evidence suggests that being the bigger person there would be more likely to protect my lawn and property, even if morally I would have the right to be angry and express that.
I think that I got it. The def mismatch wasn’t on the word “rational”, but rather on “to expect”. Based on your example you’re using it for “to anticipate, to predict”; I was reading it as “to hope, to demand”.
Now I agree with your point - yes, it’s irrational to predict/anticipate that humans will act rationally. [Sorry for the confusion]
I’m not sure that contradicts my original point.
Moral premises are often based on a felt sense rather than evidence, the should of them represents a preference which is subjective and derived from context such as environment and culture rather than evidence.
It contradicts your original point because it shows that we can’t assign the attribute “irrational” to an expectation; it’s like assigning colours to a transparent object.
I’m not sure but I think this to be true. Even then, that moral premise would be the only way to actually use the evidence to label the expectation as rational or irrational; something like “evidence shows that acting acc. to those expectations would hinder/further the moral premise, thus being irrational/rational”.
We have reached the point in the discussion where to move forwards we need to define terms.
By rational in this context I think what I’m meaning is a choice based on evidence which indicates that a given course of action is likely to result in the outcome intended.
Like how if my neighbour parks on my front lawn, my immediate response is to smash his car and the rational response is to talk to him calmly. Evidence suggests that being the bigger person there would be more likely to protect my lawn and property, even if morally I would have the right to be angry and express that.
I think that I got it. The def mismatch wasn’t on the word “rational”, but rather on “to expect”. Based on your example you’re using it for “to anticipate, to predict”; I was reading it as “to hope, to demand”.
Now I agree with your point - yes, it’s irrational to predict/anticipate that humans will act rationally. [Sorry for the confusion]
No worries! Thanks for the discussion and offering your insights. I’m impressed by your clarity and discernment.