My current company makes it real easy. All their simulated phishing addresses use the fictitious TLD of “.corn” so I just setup an email rule to filter them.
I delight in reporting genuine emails from my company that look like sophisticated phishing attempts, bonus points if they send a follow-up assuring us that the previous sketchy email was in fact genuine.
That’s a crack it open with a hex editor, find who sent it, delete then return a note to the sender letting them know you’ve removed the problematic communication, thankyouverymuch… signed ABiggerCuntThanYou@WhyIsMyCompanyWastingMoneyOnThisShit.org
A company I was in a few jobs back had several layers of IT department, there was the local studio department that handled our everyday stuff and a “head office” somewhere far away that set policy and handed out budget and whatnot.
One day “head office” IT decided it was a good idea to send out some fake phishing emails to “test” us. They didn’t tell the local IT department about it, I guess they were also being “tested”. My manager received one and only recognized it as a phishing attempt after he’d clicked just one too many things for it to feel safe to ignore. So he yanked the power on his computer and contacted the local IT department, as is protocol when something potentially dangerous just happened.
The local network went into lockdown while local IT tried to figure out if something actually dangerous had happened. It cost the studio as a whole several hours of work time, which for a studio our size translated to an obscene dollar cost. Nobody on our side of things did anything wrong, even that one extra “dangerous” click my manager did wasn’t something he could be blamed for - head office had crafted the fake phishing attempt well and his reaction to it would have prevented damage had it been real.
Phishing attempts that got far enough to actually show up in our internal corporate inboxes like that aren’t common, though. They’re normally blocked by the layers of firewalls and whatnot. We almost never saw email on those accounts from outside the organization itself, period.
And once you’ve run something capable of remote execution on a machine that’s inside the local network, with the sort of privileges that his machine had (he wasn’t just a bureaucratic sort of manager, he was writing code too), you don’t want to mess around.
They need to up their game to cover internationalized homograph vulnerabilities, using roughly similar characters from different international alphabets to create totally different domain names:
My place has this thing where most phishing test emails are obvious but every once in a while they’ll drop a really good one, sometimes these even pose as our managers.
The company I work for has lots of training to recognize phishing attempts, and then they proceed to send emails that tick most of the “avoid this” boxes.
I just take it one step farther and never open any email. If it’s important you will CC my manager and he will physically come by my office and tell me about the email, giving me multi-factor phishing protection. If he demands I open an email then I am absolved of responsibility.
My current company makes it real easy. All their simulated phishing addresses use the fictitious TLD of “.corn” so I just setup an email rule to filter them.
An actual email sent by my company. (not representative of their usual)
That’s pretty cool. Gets the point across - and the reason and results of why it matters to report instead of ignore. Kudos to your team.
Yeah if anyone falls for this lock them out of their computer immediately.
I delight in reporting genuine emails from my company that look like sophisticated phishing attempts, bonus points if they send a follow-up assuring us that the previous sketchy email was in fact genuine.
That’s a crack it open with a hex editor, find who sent it, delete then return a note to the sender letting them know you’ve removed the problematic communication, thankyouverymuch… signed ABiggerCuntThanYou@WhyIsMyCompanyWastingMoneyOnThisShit.org
That’s how you get assigned to IT overflow tickets, NGL. 😅
LOL! from the department of Don’t Threaten Me With a Good Time!
I’m betting that your current workload and their deadlines would be unaffected, is the rub.
Don’t get me wrong, I’m right there with ya! Except for the extra work, doubled expectations, and extreme discount to the co. 🙄🤢🤷🏼♂️
This is so cute.
A company I was in a few jobs back had several layers of IT department, there was the local studio department that handled our everyday stuff and a “head office” somewhere far away that set policy and handed out budget and whatnot.
One day “head office” IT decided it was a good idea to send out some fake phishing emails to “test” us. They didn’t tell the local IT department about it, I guess they were also being “tested”. My manager received one and only recognized it as a phishing attempt after he’d clicked just one too many things for it to feel safe to ignore. So he yanked the power on his computer and contacted the local IT department, as is protocol when something potentially dangerous just happened.
The local network went into lockdown while local IT tried to figure out if something actually dangerous had happened. It cost the studio as a whole several hours of work time, which for a studio our size translated to an obscene dollar cost. Nobody on our side of things did anything wrong, even that one extra “dangerous” click my manager did wasn’t something he could be blamed for - head office had crafted the fake phishing attempt well and his reaction to it would have prevented damage had it been real.
Head office never tried a stunt like that again.
All I could think as I read this was Dwight’s fire drill from the office
Given how common phishing attempts can be though, shutting down for every single one seems like overkill.
Phishing attempts that got far enough to actually show up in our internal corporate inboxes like that aren’t common, though. They’re normally blocked by the layers of firewalls and whatnot. We almost never saw email on those accounts from outside the organization itself, period.
And once you’ve run something capable of remote execution on a machine that’s inside the local network, with the sort of privileges that his machine had (he wasn’t just a bureaucratic sort of manager, he was writing code too), you don’t want to mess around.
Kemming is 100 level preparedness.
They need to up their game to cover internationalized homograph vulnerabilities, using roughly similar characters from different international alphabets to create totally different domain names:
example.com
exаmple.com
They look identical but are entirely different.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IDN_homograph_attack
Well that’s just rude
They "a"s don’t look identical at all with a good font like Atkinson Hyperlegible Next, which also very clearly differentiates between
etc…
My company is using phishing simulations from a company that puts their company name in the x headers or every email, so that’s also easy filter.
As a bonus, that filter also throws all the full security training courses to junk
If your company contracts with phish.me then that URL is actually in the email header metadata.
Just set up a rule for the word phish to a special folder, and then you can use the “report” button on everything in that folder to get the credit.
So what do you do when you get an actual phishing mail that doesn’t use that word?
lucky you. they fail us if we don’t right click report phishing.
Can still set up a header-matching rule - just need to mark the email with a label, so you can report it without even having to read it.
My place has this thing where most phishing test emails are obvious but every once in a while they’ll drop a really good one, sometimes these even pose as our managers.
The company I work for has lots of training to recognize phishing attempts, and then they proceed to send emails that tick most of the “avoid this” boxes.
I just take it one step farther and never open any email. If it’s important you will CC my manager and he will physically come by my office and tell me about the email, giving me multi-factor phishing protection. If he demands I open an email then I am absolved of responsibility.
You’d expect it to work that way. But in the real world, not always.
Lmfao, .corn sounds like an instance someone would spin up to compete with lemmy.beans
Oh man y’all remember the actual phishing campaign of messages from customer-service@bankofarnerica. com?
So what do you do when you get an actual phishing mail that doesn’t use that TLD?
The phake phish company isn’t monitoring those, so no worries!