How Do I Prepare My Phone for a Protest? (Updated 2024) – The Markup
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Simple steps to take before hitting the streets

Simple steps to take before hitting the streets

  •  Otter   ( @otter@lemmy.ca ) English
    42·
    2 years ago

    While leaving it behind is best for privacy, the article touches on some reasons people bring them anyway

    Leaving your phone behind means the data it holds and transmits will be the safest it will ever be, but it also means giving up access to important resources. It becomes much more difficult to coordinate with others, or get updates from social media. For many, phone cameras are also the only way they can document what’s happening.

    If you have access to a separate phone, whether it’s a “burner” phone, an old smartphone that you can reset, or an old-fashioned camera, you could choose to bring these devices instead of your regularly-used phone. However, not everyone has access to these devices, or can afford to purchase a separate phone just for protesting.

          •  Pantherina   ( @Pantherina@feddit.de ) 
            5·
            2 years ago

            All Android phones have Google malware installed by default, as system apps, which means those apps can do whatever they want.

            So every piece of data you put on there is possibly tracked and collected.

            Then there are 2 more problems

            • the software is proprietary and cannot be externally wiped clean
            • the software is outdated

            This makes it vulnerable to Pegasus attacks and others. There are tons of secure practices to avoid getting it, like LTE-only, HTTPS only, encrypted and trustworthy DNS, sandboxed processes, blocked javascript execution from unknown websites…

            But still if the phone is outdated there are unpatched and publicly known security issues. Just spamming them at all phones is likely to succeed as so many people run vulnerable versions, as vendors suck.

            Then if you have pegasus, the only way for security is to reflash the A/B partitions, both. Factory reset is not secure as it will keep what is already in the system partitions.

            The firmware is protected and signed by the vendors, so it is likely clean.

            But Pegasus installs itself to the phone storage.

            If you A cant obtain factory images or B cant flash the phone at all, you cannot wipe it clean.

            So a good activism phone needs

            • trustworthy and minimal system apps / stock software
            • modern software updates
            • possible to reflash whole device externally
            • nice to have: ability to verify checksum of system partition, like GrapheneOS Attestation

            This makes them poorly pretty expensive. I think a slightly outdated GrapheneOS phone is okay though.

            •  ReversalHatchery   ( @ReversalHatchery@beehaw.org ) English
              2·
              2 years ago

              Most of that is solved by installing a ROM that’s not user hostile, keeping it updated of course, and using the phone strictly as a purpose specific device.

              That means you run a trusted VPN on it so HTTP/S and DNS concerns go out the window.
              Sandboxed processes, blocked JS? Fine if you only install what’s necessary and don’t use the web browser. JS blocking is not a huge hurdle though, ublock does it with just 2 clicks.

              Then if you have pegasus, the only way for security is to reflash the A/B partitions, both. Factory reset is not secure as it will keep what is already in the system partitions.

              That’s right but I don’t think that this is enough. If the Pegasus malware (package) really is able to do that many things, it’s a walk in the park for it to modify any of the partitions, including that which contains the modem, or just data like the modem’s IMEI and MAC addresses.
              In the cause I would either restore a backup of all partitions, or throw the phone away (not literally).

              The firmware is protected and signed by the vendors, so it is likely clean.

              Except if they patched the verification mechanisms of the OS.
              Also, the firmware may be protected, but what about data partitions which are read by vulnerable software.

              This makes them poorly pretty expensive. I think a slightly outdated GrapheneOS phone is okay though.

              Are you sure? My 6 years old phone still receives LOS updates

              •  Pantherina   ( @Pantherina@feddit.de ) 
                1·
                2 years ago

                Not sure if VPN eliminates all risks with 2G and 3G, maybe it does.

                Sandboxing, javascript

                Vanadium has sandboxing but its javascript blocking is useless (no granular control)

                Mull has no process isolation at all, but support for UBO and Noscript. Bad situation

                it’s a walk in the park for it to modify any of the partitions

                These cannot be written without TPM verification or stuff, ask GrapheneOS devs about that, I dont know. The firmware signing is required, the verification will not be done inside the OS, that would be totally flawed.

                If they have the firmware signing keys, they can fuck you. If they dont, they can only write to the system partition, and Attestation can see that.

                Reading data has nothing to do with that. They likely can, but that doesnt matter.

                My 6 years old phone still receives LOS updates

                This will not include firmware and likely even the kernel.

                •  ReversalHatchery   ( @ReversalHatchery@beehaw.org ) English
                  1·
                  2 years ago

                  Not sure if VPN eliminates all risks with 2G and 3G, maybe it does.

                  It doesn’t, but probably even on modern phones it only does if you explicitly set it to only use 4G but nothing below that.

                  Mull has no process isolation at all, but support for UBO and Noscript. Bad situation

                  If you only visit known reputable websites it’s probably not really a problem, but also, I think there are chromium browsers that have addons. Not sure though if there’s one that besides that also has the security patches.

                  These cannot be written without TPM verification or stuff

                  I doubt that it couldn’t be written, I believe TPM can only verify its contents and make the phone refuse to boot if it doesn’t agree on the authenticity of the partition contents.
                  However it’s also a question which partitions are checked that way: only the system partition? Or more? Probably not all, because they can’t verify e.g. the main user data partition, because it’s ever changing contents were never signed by the manufacturer. There’s a few dozens of partitions usually so this is not trivial to answer.

                  the verification will not be done inside the OS, that would be totally flawed.

                  Yes, verification is done by one of the bootloaders. At least partly, the OS and maybe other layers must be doing it too, just remember why Magisk had a feature to hide it’s processes and the controlling app itself from select system services and other apps.

                  Reading data has nothing to do with that. They likely can, but that doesnt matter.

                  Didn’t mean that. I meant writing data that is later being read by other important system software that is vulnerable to specially crafted quirks in that data.

        •  ReversalHatchery   ( @ReversalHatchery@beehaw.org ) English
          2·
          2 years ago

          The point is not cheapness but that you don’t care about the future of that phone. It’s only a tool for the protest, if it lasts longer that’s good but you expect it to get confiscated and never given back, you don’t care what cops did with it if you get it back, it does not have data you need in your daily life or anything irreplaceable, and you’re not really afraid that it gets destroyed by accident or maliciously.

          •  Pantherina   ( @Pantherina@feddit.de ) 
            1·
            2 years ago

            Yes that is one definition.

            But what if you get it back? Or if you just keep it?

            There is a chance that you have Pegasus on there, and I wouldnt want a phone without the detection of this.

            GrapheneOS can likely detect pegasus with their Attestation and if you have it, use an external device to reflash it.

            •  ReversalHatchery   ( @ReversalHatchery@beehaw.org ) English
              1·
              2 years ago

              But what if you get it back? Or if you just keep it?

              There is a chance that you have Pegasus on there, and I wouldnt want a phone without the detection of this.

              You attempt to flash your full backup to it. And maybe then read it back if you can for verification that it was actually written to memory, but that probably won’t be possible when using fastboot. That’s all you can do that’s reliable, to some extent.

  •  henfredemars   ( @henfredemars@infosec.pub ) English
    31·
    2 years ago

    Phones are tracking devices. Do not bring your phone, not even turned off because many phones emit Bluetooth beacons and other data that can be recorded and traced.

    If you bring a phone, make sure that phone has no idea who you are.

  •  GBU_28   ( @GBU_28@lemm.ee ) English
    30·
    2 years ago

    Layer one: “front line”: folks should be acting on passive listen/pushed information from folks far back that will not get kettled or trapped. Media they collect should be Livestreamed for safe storage… But they should be focused on non violent protest, emit the protest message and find/eject bad actors. Equipment should be “burner” quality, wiped and purpose setup with the expectation of seizure.

    Layer 2: “observe, document, report”: folks should be using encrypted apps to communicate, and should intend to not be arrested, and to collect as much quality content as possible. These folks should be ready to be arrested, but avoid as possible.

    Layer 3: “coordinate”: these folks should be digesting all possible data about risks, police activity, lawful orders, movements, etc. They should be feeding information about proper actions. They should use encrypted tools but plan to avoid arrest.

    This is all hypothetical.

  •  menas   ( @menas@lemmy.wtf ) 
    15·
    2 years ago

    Pretty good stuff.

    However I read many reactions : “don’t take your phone with you” This is a common issue in a lot of activist place to don’t ask ourselves why people are acting like this ? before telling them to stop. They may have good reasons, and in a case of protests, there is.

    • Filming the cops : I don’t know in the US, but in a lot of countries, cops are less violent when they know someone is filming them. This may help people harmed by the police, in giving them evidence, or helping mobilization in the futur. After mass arrestation, it could be hard to know how as been arrested or not; some legal support hotline ask this kind of evidence for this reasons. Of course this some sensitive material, and need to be secured too. For example, the cops may target you if you are filming them.

    • Calling the legal support hotline : Some of them ask to be called just after arrestation or cops actions, to make a precise report. You could call them when someone you know have been attacked or kidnapped by the police.

    • Call medial support : I don’t know how the emergency number is linked with the repressive force in the US, but in a lot of country, it’s not. Even if it’s rare, it could be a vital issue.

    All this actions are important and individuals should compare the risks they take in taking them and what we lost in not acting like that. Of course this risks have to be documented; with flyers at the start of a protests for example.

    I would recommend to mutualise actions to decentralize risks. Make a team with one or two people with burned phone and dedicated camera (paid by everyone); let your other phones at home. Stay (at least) by pair, and keep in eye someone with a phone.

    They may be better plan of actions, but we couldn’t just let down cop watch ant street medic just for the illusion of individual safety. Such thing simply do not exist

  •  toastal   ( @toastal@lemmy.ml ) 
    13·
    2 years ago

    Signal & WhatsApp are not secure enough. Meta/Facebook regularly give data & metatadata to the cops & Signal is centralized & not self-hosted by your crew so while messages are encrypted, the metadata still isn’t. If you must use Signal, I would pick Molly as an Android client since you can a) encrypt the messages under a separate password for storage on seizure & b) you can use the UnifiedPush version to make sure your notification metadata isn’t going thru Google’s Firebase servers. Protests are the ideal place for Briar as it is works via mesh net so internet & SIM cards are not required (but years ago wden I tried it, the app was a major battery drainer).

    •  Simon Müller   ( @cyrus@sopuli.xyz ) 
      6·
      2 years ago

      the metadata still isn’t.

      That doesn’t quite work in the case of Signal

      The only data that they have, based on transparency reports and dissections of their source code, is the time you created your account and last connected to the servers.

      Messages themselves are essentially only relayed, with sealed sender, and anything that would be actually useful to identify who was at a protest and who wasn’t encrypted.

      Things like, e.g when messages arrive at the server would have to be monitored live on compromised servers, which reasonably unless you assume* it is wiretapped already prior to a protest, isn’t realistic.

      *: of course, I am saying this because making an assumption and portraying it as truth (e.g assuming something is already wiretapped based on no evidence at all) is not the smartest of moves when it comes to threat modeling…especially if you wanna stay sane whilst having a threat model

      •  toastal   ( @toastal@lemmy.ml ) 
        1·
        2 years ago

        With the right intel you could piece back some of the pieces, especially with some pieces from other sources, with just that metadata. With metadata, it’s about putting together lots of sources to see the picture clearly which is why Facebook bought WhatsApp for just the metadata (& address book). The thing is that you, can skip Signal & you will still have several free software messaging alternativ where nothing is on a US-based server where they can subpoena.

        •  RealJoL   ( @RealJoL@feddit.de ) 
          1·
          2 years ago

          But that’d already entail control over the whole Signal AWS in- and egress as well as any VPN you may be using and/or your local ISP. And then you still have to prove the actual link to the natural person. At that point we’re speaking of a threat level assuming the US DoD as adversary. While not impossible, I think if you’re willing to pick that kind of fight, you’re clever enough not to rely on Signal (or most digital communication).

          Signal is not WhatsApp, there aren’t a lot of data points linking your communications to end points in the same way Meta does link them.

          •  toastal   ( @toastal@lemmy.ml ) 
            1·
            2 years ago

            Not saying you are wrong, but I think the argument a) should mention WhatsApp in the same breath as Signal & b) stopping at Signal instead of linking to where to find more info

    •  BrikoX   ( @BrikoX@lemmy.zip ) OPEnglish
      5·
      2 years ago

      You are absolutely right about metadata, but as far as protests, just having encryption is enough to prevent anyone from accessing the data. Extracting metadata from 3rd party companies or extracting a phone requires a lot more resources than cops can spare.

      •  toastal   ( @toastal@lemmy.ml ) 
        1·
        2 years ago

        In the corpo cases, I’m sure all they have to do is ask. There are better alternatives & this guide feels radically incomplete stopping at such pedestrian option instead of labeling them in a bottom tier of like suffiecent-if-you-literally-can’t-use-anything-else.

      •  toastal   ( @toastal@lemmy.ml ) 
        3·
        2 years ago

        Those components are not really meant for self-hosting, its open to be looked at. You would need to patch out the SIM requirement, point the hardcoded server/clients elsewhere, find some way to sideload modified clients to those using iOS lol, & it’s not federated so you would need a separate app for just this task. At this rate you are 100% better off using a choosing systems where server & clients are actually built with this in mind… Signal’s chat features are not novel

  •  Trent   ( @Trent@lemmy.ml ) English
    8·
    2 years ago

    I wouldn’t even bring my phone, or if I absolutely needed something like that, I’d buy a cheapass pre-paid burner. And keep it off until you actually need it.